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abstract
This article examines the development of a women’s movement in Iraq since the
invasion in 2003. It describes the types of activities and the strategies of different
women activists, as well as highlights the main divisions among them. The article also
discusses the various ways in which the ongoing occupation and escalating violence in
Iraq has shaped women’s activism and the object of their struggles. Communal and
sectarian tensions had been fostered by the previous regime as well as by the political
opposition in exile prior to 2003, but the systematic destruction of national
institutions, such as the army and the policy, by the occupation forces, has led to a
flare-up of the sectarian conflict. The article concludes by evaluating women’s
activism in terms of its contributions to conflict on the one hand and national
reconciliation on the other.
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The ongoing conflict in Iraq and escalating violence since the invasion in 2003 has
unfolded against the backdrop of a society and an economy decimated by over a
decade of comprehensive sanctions, previous wars and militarization, in addition
to a civil society destroyed by decades of brutal dictatorship (Sluglett and
Farouk-Sluglett, 2001; Dodge, 2005; Al-Ali, 2007).1 Communal and sectarian
tensions were fostered by the previous regime as well as by the political
opposition in exile prior to 2003, but the systematic destruction of national
institutions, such as the army and the police, as well as other decisions taken by
the occupation authorities, have led to a rapid expansion in communal, tribal
and sectarian religious identities and, more significantly, their incorporation into
political structures and institutions emerging since the US-led invasion (Dodge,
2005; Herring and Rangwala, 2006). Various political groups, including the former
opposition in exile that dominate the central government, as well as those that
have formed to resist the occupation and/or central government, have each
targeted women and gender relations, through measures ranging between
legislation and the use of physical violence, as part of their political projects to
gain authority (Al-Ali and Pratt 2006, 2007). It is within this context of
occupation, fragmenting authority, competing visions of the political future of
Iraq, growing conservative gender ideologies, militarization and widespread
violence, including different forms of violence against women, that Iraqi women
activists, both inside Iraq and from the diaspora, organize.
In this article, we will examine the development of the women’s movement in Iraq
since 2003. We will describe the types of activities and the strategies of different
women activists, as well as highlight the main divisions. The article also discusses
the various ways in which the ongoing conflict in Iraq has shaped women’s
activism and the object of their struggles. Finally, we will attempt to evaluate
women’s activism in terms of its contributions to national reconciliation.
creation of women’s organizations after the fall
of the Ba‘th regime
Women’s organizations have existed in Iraq ever since the creation of the Iraqi
state under the British mandate in 1920. They were formed by the wives of the
elite who embraced the idea of ‘the new woman’ and established the first Iraqi
women’s movement entitled the Women’s Awakening (Nahda al-Nisa’). Women
activists at the time mainly engaged in charity work, but also advocated for
women’s education, leading to the establishment of the first women’s college in
Iraq in the 1930s. During the 1930s, women’s associations set up charitable
organizations, including shelters for orphans and health centres, to address the
growing ‘social question’ and lack of welfare provision by the state (Kamp, 2003).
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The movement for women’s rights gathered momentum in the 1940s and 1950s as
part of the revolutionary movement against the monarchy and continuing British
influence over Iraqi politics. In the early 1950s, the League for the Defence
of Iraqi Women’s Rights (Rabitat al-difa‘ ‘an huquq al-mara’)2 was established
by female members of the Iraqi Communist Party and quickly began to gain
influence and following. The League contributed to the passage of a unified
personal status code in 1959, which was regarded as a progressive step for
women’s rights. During the post-revolutionary years (1958–1963), the Iraqi
Women’s League played an important role as a vehicle for reforms and
modernization.
Women’s public organizing was practically eliminated under the regime of
Saddam Hussein, except for the Ba‘th-sponsored General Federation of Iraqi
Women (Ittihad al-‘am li-nisa’ al-‘iraq), although some women continued to
participate in underground movements linked to opposition political parties. The
creation of the safe haven in the Kurdish north of Iraq in 1991 enabled Kurdish
women, who already had a long history of activism within political parties, to
increase their involvement through participation in women’s unions, women’s
organizations and groups not linked to political parties. For women in the centre
and south of Iraq, the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 represents the major
turning point in the creation of new organizations and groups, including women’s
groups and networks.
Women’s organizations inside Iraq are simultaneously involved in trying to
address practical needs while pursuing more strategic lobbying and campaigning.
In terms of ‘strategic’ interests, women have mobilized to protect and to further
women’s rights and participation in public life. In particular, they have
campaigned (1) against attempts to replace the relatively progressive personal
status law governing marriage, divorce and child custody with a more
conservative law (Decree 137 issued by the Interim Governing Council at the
end of 2003, and Article 41 of the new constitution, ratified in 2005 but that is
under review for reasons of national reconciliation)3; (2) to include a women’s
quota of elected representatives in central, regional and local government; (3)
against Islamist encroachment by political parties and militias; (4) to limit the
constitutional role of Islam to include constitutional guarantees that legislation
complies with international conventions, including Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW); and (5) against the
targeted assassinations of professional women and women rights activists. In
terms of ‘practical’ interests, Iraqi women’s groups have organized training for
women in vocational skills and income-generation activities, from bee-keeping
to tailoring, as well as providing healthcare services, such as mobile clinics, and
humanitarian relief to women and their families.
In the wake of the fall of the Ba‘th regime, hundreds of women’s organizations
mushroomed in the centre and south of Iraq, adding to the already significant
2 The name was
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numbers in the Kurdish region, such as Al-Amal, Women Empowerment
Organisation, Rewan Women Centre, as well as the women’s unions linked to
different political parties in the Kurdish region. While there are no reliable
statistics available, all observers are in agreement that the number of new civil
society organizations, including NGOs and political parties, formed in the
aftermath of the invasion reaches into the hundreds. Of these, a significant
number were women’s organizations, such as the National Council of Women, the
1,000 Women’s Conference, the Society of Iraqi Women for the Future and the
Iraqi Independent Women’s Group, to mention only a few. As one NGO worker who
had been in Baghdad in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam, told
Nicola, ‘Iraqi women’s organizations got themselves organized much faster than
anyone else’.
The majority of women activists we interviewed were motivated by real needs on
the ground combined with a desire to take advantage of newly acquired freedoms
of association, rather than the availability of funding from US and other
governmental/non-governmental agencies. Indeed, initially following the fall of
the Ba‘th regime, ‘there were so many people [in US government agencies]
talking about the importance [of women’s participation] that it was hard at first
to recognize that few of them had any resources to put to the issue’, the same
NGO worker commented to Nicola. Small sums of money became available
through the Office of Transition Initiatives (part of the US Agency for
International Development), while other US-funded programmes (e.g., through
the United States Institute for Peace, the National Endowment for Democracy
and the Research Triangle Institute) attempted to ensure that women made up a
particular percentage (usually around 30%) of the beneficiaries of training
sessions and seminars, for example, The Women’s Affairs Office in the Coalition
Provisional Authority acted as a clearing house, linking newly created women’s
organizations with available seed money, rather than having a dedicated budget
for promoting women’s participation. It also put a lot of effort into obtaining
buildings to establish women’s centers – places where women could receive
training in vocational and/or professional skills, as well as seeking legal advice.
However, many Iraqi women were afraid to attend the centres, which were
associated with the occupation, and often regarded with suspicion, if not as a
target for insurgents, by the respective local communities.
In March 2004, the US announced, to much fanfare, a $10 million ‘Women’s
Democracy Initiative’, which provided grants to NGOs to carry out the so-called
democracy education, leadership training, political training, NGO coalition-
building, organizational management, media training and teaching entrepreneur-
ship (Office of the Senior Coordinator for International Women’s Issues, 2004).
These grants were distributed to seven, US-based, organizations/groups of
organizations, including the neo-conservative Independent Women’s Forum, Johns



































Watch. According to Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky,
the initiative aimed ‘to help women become full and vibrant partners in Iraq’s
developing democracy’ (USINFO, 2004). Several women activists, who, in 2004,
took part enthusiastically in workshops and campaigns to promote voter
education, since feel bitter or frustrated by US attempts to promote democracy
in Iraq according to a short timetable. H.Sumaya told Nadje in 2007: ‘We did not
need democracy training in five star hotels. We needed humanitarian assistance
and a proper political process.’ Similarly, Shahrzad Mojab finds a huge gap
between the types of programmes implemented by some women’s organizations
and funded by foreign donors in Iraqi Kurdistan, on the one hand, and the actual
poverty and marginalization experienced by a significant percentage of Kurdish
women, on the other (Mojab, 2007).
The women involved in women’s organizations tend to be urban-based, middle-
class women, of various ethnic and religious backgrounds. Nevertheless, some of
the organizations have a broad membership and have branches throughout the
country. The Iraqi Women’s Network (Al-Shabaka), for example, consists of over
80 women’s grassroots organizations that are spread throughout Iraq. The
activities of the constituent organizations address both ‘practical’ and ‘strategic’
interests. Al-Shabaka demonstrates how women rights activists can work across
political differences (whether in terms of their political party ties or lack
thereof), as well as their specific attitudes vis-a-vis the US occupation. Some
ask for an immediate withdrawal of troops viewing the occupation as responsible
for the escalating violence and a failed government: others prefer to call for a
concrete timetable of withdrawal, while some prefer the US and UK troops to
remain out of fear of Islamist militancy and terrorism. Meanwhile, they have been
united in their opposition to Article 41 of the constitution and in calling for
guarantees for women’s rights based on CEDAW.
In particular, the campaign around the personal status law has contributed to
mobilizing an Iraqi women’s movement. As a result of the passing of Decree 137,
in late 2003, thousands of women in Baghdad and the Kurdish region protested,
calling for the decree to be repealed (‘Iraqi Women Divided’, 2004). This moment
of upsurge in women’s activism has been identified as an important turning point
for the Iraqi women’s movement. It contributed to coalescing women in defence
of their rights and gave an impetus to the lobbying for a woman’s quota (of 40%)
in a future elected assembly. Women’s protests contributed to overturning Decree
137, to ensuring the inclusion of a 25% quota (a compromise figure) in the
Transitional Administrative Law, signed in March 2004 (and later the permanent
constitution) and to the appointment of six women cabinet ministers and
seven deputy ministers within the transitional government of Iyad Allawi (30 June
2004–2007, April 2005).
However, there exist some divisions among Iraqi women activists, which represent
obstacles to the creation of a unified movement. One of these divisions concerns









the involvement of women from the diaspora. Following the fall of the regime in
April 2003, several Iraqi women from the diaspora returned to Iraq to encourage
Iraqi women’s political mobilization. K. Nawal,4 an activist involved in the
women’s movement from its early stages in 2003, commented to Nadje with a
tone of bitterness:
There are those organisations that are initiated by women from the outside.
Many of the leading activists lived in exile for many years. They do not really
know what is going on inside. Many of these women are close to male political
leaders and are part of the Iraqi bourgeoisie. So there are all these groups
that are linked to political parties and male politicians. But then we have real
grassroots organisations as well. Women who know what is going on and do not
fear to get their hands dirty. They don’t just sit in fancy hotels and talk. Even
some of the women who came from outside are involved in these.
In addition to some evidence of divisions between local and diaspora activists,
women also differ over the role of religion in public life. H. Reem, a journalist
who was linked to the Iraqi Women’s League in the 1980s, told Nicola, ‘This
division, between Islamist women and secular women, is new in Iraq. There were
never these divisions before’. This divide has been made particularly apparent
with regard to debates over the personal status law. Women associated with the
Shi‘i Islamist parties of al-Dawa‘ and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC,
formerly known as SCIRI or the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq)
have protested in favour of placing family law under religious jurisdiction (‘Iraqi
Women Divided’, 2004), while women elected on the United Iraqi Alliance list
have also supported measures that R. Suzan, a member of parliament in
Baghdad, sees as ‘against their interests [as women]’.
In response, some secular-oriented women rights activists have not been eager
or, in some cases, able to find common ground and make strategic alliances with
women from religious parties, seeing the situation as a zero-sum game. F. Radwa,
the founder of a women’s organization in the Kurdish region, told Nicola that,
‘the majority of women’s organisations in the rest of Iraq want to introduce Islam
into public life, but this threatens women’s rights and democracy.yNow we are
scared that the religious parties will take away our rights in Kurdistan’. Indeed,
the large number of Islamist women who make up parliament (as part of the
United Iraqi Alliance bloc) has led some secular-oriented women to question the
benefits of a women’s quota.
Nevertheless, despite quite fundamental differences over the nature of ‘strategic
gender interests’, some women are working across the religious/secular divide on
the basis of shared ‘practical gender interests’. For example, in the parliament in
Baghdad, attempts to create a women’s caucus failed in 2006. However, at the
time of writing, some women MPs are attempting to cooperate based on ‘things















that we agree upon, [such as], trying to improve ourselves through training,
networking with other Arab women parliamentarians and trying to get more
responsibilities in our own parties and in the parliamentary committees’, as R.
Suzan stated over coffee in the lobby of a hotel in her constituency in Kurdistan.
Similarly, at the level of one provincial council, women from Islamist and secular
parties have been working together to promote women’s socio-economic
conditions, which, as provincial council member A.Q. Jailan told Nicola, ‘is a
material question and not an ideological one’.
the impact of the conflict on women’s organizing
One of the most pressing obstacles to the women’s movement in Iraq has been
the increasing violence and lawlessness since the fall of the regime. Measures
taken by the occupation authorities to disband the army and police force,
coupled with the slow progress in training new soldiers and police officers, have
had devastating consequences for the security of ordinary men and women. While
men constitute the majority of victims of violence, the lack of security impacts
upon women in particular ways. Violence against women has increased since the
immediate post-invasion chaos, when an alarming number of cases of sexual
violence and abductions of women and girls were identified in Baghdad alone
(Human Rights Watch, 2003). Women have been abducted by gangs, raped,
beaten and their bodies dumped or they are sold into prostitution (Ibid.;
Al-Jazeera, 2006). If they manage to survive the ordeal, the stigma attached to
rape deters women from coming forward to report cases of sexual violence. They
could be killed by their families in order to protect their ‘honour’. Many women
activists have been threatened and/or assassinated by various armed groups,
including the increasingly powerful Islamist militias and insurgent groups.
Regarded as bearers of the moral purity of their families and even their
communities, women’s experience of violence and the threat of violence
differentiates them from men. Women are afraid to travel to seek healthcare,
education, to work or even to leave the house to do shopping, let alone to
participate in public activism.
The sources of violence in Iraq are multiple. The vast majority of the violence that
is targeted at the middle classes is perpetrated by criminal gangs, who exploit
the security vacuum created by the US-led occupation and ease of access to
small arms. This violence includes kidnappings, car-jackings and burglaries. The
political violence occurs between the US-led military and Iraqi police forces, on
the one hand, and a variety of different groups making up the insurgency, on the
other, as well as between militia groups, such as the Mahdi Army. Hundreds of
ordinary Iraqis, particularly men but also women, are caught in the cross-fire of
the conflict between these groups, as well as being victims of counter-insurgency
measures that violate basic human rights standards (the Abu Ghrayb prison
torture being the most widely publicized case). There are also the intimidation,









harassment and targeted assassinations carried out by militia groups linked to
various political parties who are in government.
For women activists, the risk of being a victim of violence and/or intimidation
becomes higher as their involvement in public life challenges the views of Islamist
militia and insurgent groups with regard to appropriate gender relations and
gender roles. In particular, women’s participation in the public sphere is seen by
some Islamists to symbolize western cultural encroachment of Iraq, as well as
being associated with the perceived secular nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime.
The context of foreign occupation has helped to create an intensification of
conservative gender ideologies, which are promoted not only by armed Islamist
groups but also political parties in government.
Many women activists have left the country or have sought refuge in Iraqi
Kurdistan after receiving death threats from armed groups. Those who remain in
central and south Iraq often fear for their lives and those of their families and
friends on a daily basis. The official police force and the national government
have done little to protect women. Indeed, many Iraqis have no trust in the police
to provide security to ordinary people and see them as focusing on implementing
the US-led counter-insurgency measures. Consequently, meetings between women
activists have become virtually impossible and women activists are forced to risk
their lives to travel to neighbouring Jordan to participate in meetings and
conferences. Men (e.g., university professors and medical doctors) are also
similarly targeted by Islamist militia and insurgents. However, the perception
that women are somehow more vulnerable makes it more likely that threats of
violence will lead women to abandon public participation.
Obviously, this impacts tremendously on the ability to sustain women’s activism
in Iraq. Women activists in the south and central Iraq perceive the ongoing
violence as the biggest obstacle to their work. Even in Iraqi Kurdistan, which, at
the time of writing, is largely unaffected by violence, women activists emphasize
the ongoing conflict in the rest of Iraq as a barrier to networking with women
there. Women activists see different reasons behind the violence, including the
US/UK occupation and counter-insurgency measures, the conflict between
different militias, the sectarianism of different political leaders, the
ineffectiveness of the police, the poor socio-economic conditions that drive
young men to join armed groups, as well as the terrorism perpetrated by former
regime loyalists and Al-Qaeda-led foreign fighters. All these sources of violence
are interlinked, as the invasion and occupation have created the conditions for
the growth in power of communally based political groups who use conservative
gender ideologies in the process of asserting their authority against rivals, as well
as the widespread availability of small arms, high unemployment and
deteriorating humanitarian conditions.









Iraqi women’s activism: source of conflict
or reconciliation?
In light of the devastating impact of violence on the development of Iraq, some
women’s groups have addressed their activism to this question. However, Iraqi
women are not in agreement over the ways in which this reconciliation may be
achieved. In particular, there are differences of opinion over the continuing
presence of US troops. On the one hand, some women believe that US troops are
necessary to defeat the Islamist militias and stop the sectarian violence, while
other women see US troops as a source of this violence and call for the
immediate withdrawal of coalition troops and an end to the occupation.
However, these differences do not appear to prevent women inside Iraq from
working together, unlike many women activists in the diaspora, who tend to be
extremely polarized in their opinions about the occupation. Members of the Iraqi
Women’s Network (al-Shabaka), for example, which consists of over 80 different
women’s organizations, work across differences in terms of demanding an
immediate withdrawal of troops, a schedule for withdrawal or a future withdrawal
after the establishment of greater security and law and order.
Some women’s organizations in the diaspora may also contribute more actively to
constructing sectarian divisions and tensions by engaging in identity politics and
stressing the specific suffering and plight of their ethnic and or religious group,
while dismissing that of others. This was evident among Islamist Shi’i women in
Dearborn who were linked to the Dawa party, Kurdish women activists in San Diego
and Assyrian women activists in London that Nadje interviewed. Identity politics
appear to be particularly significant among Iraqi diaspora women in the US, where
the overall political climate and discourse appears to promote an assertion of
communal identities – although the assertion of ethnic and religious identities can
be found throughout the diaspora as well as increasingly inside Iraq, where a de
facto confessional political system has emerged and the destruction of Iraqi state
institutions has led to the weakening of a national Iraqi identity.
However, despite differences of opinion with regards to the US presence in Iraq,
women activists inside Iraq have been at the forefront of expressing their
opposition to sectarian politics. Several initiatives, campaigns, conferences and
networks attempt to promote national unity and reconciliation. The vast majority
of women’s groups disavow sectarianism and do not regard sectarian divisions as
characterizing the woman’s movement. The attempt to stem sectarianism has
been one of the reasons why secular-oriented women activists have campaigned
against the replacement of the unified personal status code. Article 41 (and its
predecessor, Decree 137) not only threatens women’s rights by placing personal
status issues under the control of religious leaders. In addition, by stating that
‘Iraqis are free in their adherence to their personal status according to their own









religion, sect, belief and choice’, this article potentially contributes to sectarian
tensions and divisions as it is based on and meant to reify communal and
religious differences. In light of the link between communal identities, political
competition and violence, including violence against women, and conservative
gender ideologies, the future of Iraqi personal status laws is critical for the
future of women’s rights and eradication of sectarian differences.
Yet, opposition to Article 41 has highlighted splits among Iraqi women activists.
As noted above, Islamist women activists have demonstrated support for the
repeal of a unified personal status code. Although these divisions are generally
expressed in terms of secular versus religious, there are times when positions
towards Islam in public life become entwined with sectarian identifications. For
example, T. Leila, employed by a US NGO in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003, told
Nicola, ‘In the Iraqi constitution, they talk about the role of sharia and allowing
polygamy. In the south of Iraq, they don’t think that this is a problem. Only in the
north are we asking for women’s rights in the constitution. Only the Kurdish
parties are asking for women’s rights’.
The perception by some women that women’s rights will be protected by the
Kurdish parties (against attempts by ‘Arab’ Iraqis in the rest of the country to
impose sharia) is a boost to the credibility of the Kurdish national leaders, who,
nevertheless, are part of the process of sectarian politics conducted at the
national level. Indeed, several women activists have stated that while Kurdish
political leaders have voiced their opposition to Article 41, there are also fears
that they would be willing to ‘trade’ this opposition for Kurdish control over the
city of Kirkuk and its province.
The sectarian nature of Iraqi politics on the national level considerably narrows the
possibility for non-sectarian initiatives by women’s groups. The party list system for
elections to national, regional and local bodies contributes to stifling independent
voices that may challenge sectarian-based politics. S. Reem, the founder of a
women’s organization in the south of Iraq and a member of ‘al-Shabaka’, told
Nicola that she was forced to cede defeat in local elections, despite winning more
votes than some of the party-affiliated candidates, after receiving death threats
from Islamist militia in her town. ‘They think I’m a threat because I am not a
member of any party’. Meanwhile, A. Aida, a member of parliament in Baghdad,
addressing a roundtable discussion in London, lamented that, ‘Women feel most
vulnerable because they are not part of militias and are not protected by militias.
[y] These militias are in parliament and they are close to government’.
conclusion
In the post-invasion period, political spaces initially opened up for women
activists but have since been severely curtailed, if not largely eradicated, by the









increasing violence, rooted in military intervention, continuous misjudgement and
reckless incompetence by the occupation, sectarian politics and competition for
authority in the new Iraq, as well as resistance to US occupation. Those women
activists closely linked to political parties and influential male politicians have
been able to carve out spaces for themselves and continue to be involved in
processes related to political transition and reconstruction. However, the vast
majority of women activists have been marginalized, silenced or forced into low-
profile activism. Nevertheless, there are women who continue to be active and
have attempted to work across divisions and to promote national reconciliation,
in particular with regard to women’s ‘practical interests’. However, identifying
women’s strategic interests continues to divide women along religious/secular
lines, and sometimes along religious and ethnic lines.
The links between foreign occupation, on the one hand, and conservative gender
ideologies, sectarian identities and violence, on the other, highlight the
importance of conceptualizing ‘strategic gender interests’ not only in terms of
women’s rights and women’s participation but, equally, in terms of engaging with
the wider political and military context that gives rise to militant Islamism,
sectarian and ethnic politics, and massive insecurities, as these operate to
undermine women’s rights. Without a consensus over the causes of violence,
sectarian and ethnic-based politics and conservative gender ideologies, women
activists’ attempts at national reconciliation remain limited.
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